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Abstract: The concept of exploitation is central in social and political theory, but there is no 
precise, widely accepted definition. This paper analyses John Roemer’s seminal theory, which 
construes exploitation as a distributive injustice arising from asset inequalities, with no reference 
to notions of power or dominance. First, an intertemporal generalisation of Roemer’s static 
economies is set up and several doubts are raised on the claim that exploitation can be reduced to a 
kind of resource egalitarianism. Then, Roemer’s philosophical arguments that exploitation should 
be defined as a merely distributive concept are also questioned and it is argued that a notion of 
power, or dominance, is an essential part of the definition of exploitation. Finally, Roemer’s path-
breaking methodological claim that standard general equilibrium models can provide robust 
microfoundations to exploitation and classes is critically analysed.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The notion of exploitation is prominent in the social sciences and in political 
discourse. It is central in a number of debates, ranging from analyses of labour 
relations, especially focusing on the weakest segments of the labour force, such as 
children, women, and migrants (see, e.g., ILO, 2005; 2006); to controversies on 
drug-testing and on the price of life-saving drugs, especially in developing 
countries;1 to ethical issues arising in surrogate motherhood (see, e.g., Field, 1989; 
Wood, 1995). The concept of exploitation is also the cornerstone of Marxist social 
theory, and it is central in the politics of the Left. In the 2007 programme of the 
German Social Democratic Party, for example, the very first paragraph advocates 
a society ‘free from poverty, exploitation, and fear’ (SPD, 2007: 3), and the fight 
against exploitation is repeatedly indicated as a priority for the biggest party of the 
European Left. The notion of exploitation is not confined to Marxist approaches, 
though, and it is extensively discussed in normative theory and political 
philosophy (see, e.g., Wertheimer, 1996; Wolff, 1999; Bigwood, 2003; and 
Sample, 2003). Yet, perhaps surprisingly, there is little agreement concerning 
even the most basic features of exploitive relations, and both the definition of 
exploitation and its normative content are highly controversial.2 
A particularly relevant and contentious question concerns the role of 
distributive issues, on the one hand, and of relations of coercion, force, or power, 
on the other hand, in positive and normative exploitation theory. At the most 
general level, A exploits B if and only if A takes unfair advantage of B. But do 
exploitive relations mainly, or uniquely, involve some (wrongful) characteristic of 
the structure of the interaction between A and B (such as asymmetric relations of 
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power, force, etc.)? Or is exploitation mainly, or uniquely, concerned with some 
form of (wrongful) inequality (in asset ownership, labour exchanged, etc.)? 
A path-breaking answer to the latter questions is provided by John Roemer’s 
seminal theory (Roemer, 1982a, 1988), which represents one of the most rigorous 
and general approaches to exploitation and class, and a pivotal reference point for 
debates in political philosophy and in the social sciences. Roemer’s approach is a 
very innovative and controversial contribution to Marxist theory, but it raises a 
number of substantive and methodological issues that are crucial for all 
exploitation theorists, and indeed for all social scientists.  
Given the richness of Roemer’s theory, it is worth rehearsing the main 
arguments here. Consider an economy with N identical producers who minimise 
labour, subject to a subsistence requirement, and trade commodities and labour.3 
Roemer defines Marxian exploitation as an unequal exchange of labour (hereafter 
UE): an agent is exploited (an exploiter) if and only if she works more (less) time 
than is embodied in her consumption bundle. If there is differential ownership of 
productive assets (hereafter, DOPA), Roemer proves that in equilibrium labour 
time is unequally distributed, and each agent’s class and exploitation status is 
determined by asset ownership: wealthy agents are net hirers of labour 
(capitalists) and exploiters, poor agents are net sellers of labour (proletarians) and 
are exploited. Further, the subsistence economy with a labour market is 
isomorphic to an identical economy with a capital market instead: wealthy agents 
are net lenders and exploiters, poor agents are net borrowers and exploited. 
These results can be extended to accumulation economies and, according to 
Roemer, show that neoclassical microfoundations can be provided to exploitation 
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and class. They also prove that the labour market is not ‘intrinsically necessary for 
bringing about the Marxian phenomena of exploitation and class … competitive 
markets and [DOPA] are the institutional culprits in producing exploitation and 
class’ (Roemer, 1982a: 93). Therefore, exploitation should not be defined as the 
expropriation of labour at the point of production. The definition that focuses 
simply on UE – ‘whether or not there is a production relation between the agents 
in which one “extracts” the labour of another’ (Roemer, 1985: 54) – is preferable.4 
The UE definition itself is problematic, though, according to Roemer. If 
agents have heterogeneous labour endowments or preferences, ‘it is possible for 
some very wealthy producers to be exploited and for some very poor producers to 
be exploiters’ (Roemer, 1982a: 175).5 Therefore, UE exploitation ‘in the general 
case, is misconceived. It does not provide a proper model or account of Marxian 
moral sentiments’ (Roemer, 1985: 54). Roemer provides an alternative approach 
that focuses on property relations, which aims to generalise Marxian exploitation 
‘in terms of the institutional variation permitted’ (Roemer, 1982b: 256) and to 
capture its essential normative content, which is interpreted as requiring ‘an 
egalitarian distribution of resources in the external world’ (Roemer, 1994: 3).  
Consider a private-ownership economy with a set N of agents. The property 
relations (hereafter, PR) definition of exploitation can be summarised as follows.  
DEFINITION 1 (PR). Let C ⊆ N be a coalition and let C' be its complement in N. C 
is capitalistically exploited by C' if and only if there is a hypothetically feasible 
alternative such that (i) C would improve by withdrawing from the economy with 
its per capita share of alienable assets; and (ii) C' would be worse off.6 
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Roemer proves that in simple economies PR is equivalent to UE, but unlike 
the latter, it accurately reflects asset inequalities in more general settings, too. He 
also constructs a number of examples to argue that whenever they render different 
answers as concerns the existence of exploitation and the identity of exploited 
agents, it is PR that captures Marxist normative intuitions (see, e.g., Roemer, 
1982d, 1985). Further, according to Roemer, the injustice associated with UE as 
such is unclear, whereas PR clearly shows the ethical imperative of Marxian 
exploitation theory, namely the elimination of asset inequalities.7 
Actually, the PR approach can provide the foundations of an original Marxist 
theory of distributive justice in capitalist economies that focuses on unequal 
distributions of endowments. Roemer (1988: 57-69) contends that in capitalist 
economies asset inequalities derive either from an original accumulation 
characterised by ‘robbery and plunder’, or from morally arbitrary factors, such as 
luck, or socially determined saving preferences and skills. In either case, 
exploitation can be condemned on grounds of equality of opportunity and PR 
identifies a Marxist ethical imperative that requires to eliminate DOPA in order to 
equalise opportunities. Thus, Marxian exploitation theory ‘directs our moral 
inquiry into why [DOPA] should constitute injustice’ (Roemer, 1989a: 391) and 
such concern for asset inequalities is indeed its fundamental legacy.  
This paper provides a critical analysis of Roemer’s seminal substantive and 
methodological claims. From a substantive viewpoint, the main aim is to question 
the view that exploitation theory reduces to ‘a kind of resource egalitarianism’ 
(Roemer, 1994: 2) and to underline the relevance of notions of power, force, or 
dominance. The two main arguments developed by Roemer are analysed in turn. 
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Sections 2 and 3 discuss the claim that DOPA ‘and competitive markets are 
sufficient institutions to generate an exploitation phenomenon’ (Roemer, 1982a: 
43) and thus exploitation can be reduced to a distributive concern for asset 
inequalities. In section 2, the logical structure of the argument is clarified and 
some common criticisms of Roemer’s formal approach are analysed. It is argued 
that wholesale rejections on a priori methodological or exegetical grounds are not 
compelling, and they do not challenge the core logical argument. In section 3, an 
alternative, more focused critical approach is developed. It is argued that 
Roemer’s economies are inherently static and thus seem unsuitable to analyse 
exploitation as a persistent phenomenon. Then a full dynamic generalisation of 
Roemer’s models is set up and several doubts are raised on the claim that DOPA 
and competitive markets are sufficient to generate persistent exploitation.8  
Section 4 analyses Roemer’s second main argument according to which 
exploitation should be defined in purely distributive terms. To be sure, Roemer is 
quite effective in criticising approaches that focus on domination and direct 
coercion, and in stressing the relevance of distributive issues in exploitation 
theory. It is unclear, though, that weaker forms of asymmetric relations between 
agents should also be ruled out. Section 4 explores the normative foundations of 
exploitation and argues that purely distributive definitions have too impoverished 
an informational basis to capture exploitive relations and to distinguish 
exploitation from other forms of injustice, or wrongs. In particular, a notion of 
power, or dominance, is an essential part of exploitive relations. Some promising 
lines for further research in this direction are then briefly discussed in section 5.  
 7
This paper also analyses Roemer’s path-breaking methodological 
contribution, namely the provision of neoclassical microfoundations to class and 
exploitation, which makes him one of the most prominent exponents of ‘Rational 
Choice Marxism’.9 Section 2 discusses the role of formal models in social theory 
and it questions a priori criticisms of all attempts to analyse exploitation and class 
within a broadly defined neoclassical framework. Yet the results presented in 
section 3 raise serious doubts on the possibility of understanding exploitation and 
class by means of ‘standard general equilibrium models’ (Roemer, 1986b: 193). 
Finally, it is worth noting that although this paper is not a survey, it does 
provide the first thorough review of the large literature on Roemer’s theory. 
2. MODELLING EXPLOITATION 
Given the scope and relevance of Roemer’s conclusions, it is not surprising 
that they have generated a vast debate. This section discusses the main criticisms 
of Roemer’s theory, which mostly focus on a priori methodological and exegetical 
issues. The main aim is to clarify both the logical structure of Roemer’s argument 
that exploitation can be reduced to DOPA, and the critical approach adopted in 
this paper. The discussion, however, also raises some methodological issues that 
are central in the social sciences. 
A significant number of criticisms question the very role of formal models in 
the social sciences (and in particular in exploitation theory), and the relevance of 
the results drawn from them. Some objections reflect a rather popular post-
modern epistemological stance that reduces mathematics, and indeed all scientific 
languages, to mere ‘discourses’. Post-modern critics thus deflate the explanatory 
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power of Roemer’s models to the vanishing point, by interpreting mathematics as 
a form of ‘illustration’, whereby ‘mathematical concepts and models can be 
understood as metaphors or heuristic devices’ (Ruccio, 1991: 36; see also 
Amariglio, Callari, and Cullenberg, 1989). A well-known problem with this 
approach is that it is unclear how competing hypotheses can be rationally 
evaluated, let alone tested. Further, this conception of mathematics reflects the 
post-modern denial of the explanatory power of theoretical abstractions. Yet the 
emphasis on rather elusive ‘historically concrete social processes’ does not lead 
beyond the formulation of vague, if not empty, general statements, such as that 
classes ‘can be analysed as the determinate result of the entire constellation of 
social processes that can be said to make up a society or social formation at any 
point in time; in turn, [they] will be only one of the myriad determinants of those 
nonclass social processes’ (ibid.: 38). 
Other critics question Roemer’s emphasis on formalism, arguing that it tends 
to neglect important theoretical and political issues that resist mathematical 
formulation, whereas some critical facts about capitalism ‘can be established 
without mathematical proof’ (Wood, 1989: 47).10 In a general perspective, these 
objections may support methodological pluralism, but they do not entail the 
rejection of formal models. Theoretical abstraction is essential to isolate the core 
features of a problem and the fundamental causal links, and all explanatory 
theories – formal or informal – contain assumptions, claims about the conditions 
under which the explanations hold. Formal modelling is undoubtedly one rigorous 
way of deriving causal explanations from a clearly stated set of assumptions. To 
be sure, a model ‘is necessarily one schematic image of a theory ... Nevertheless 
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… the production of different and contradicting models of the same theory can be 
the very process that directs our focus to the gray areas of the theory’ (Roemer, 
1981: 3). Further, no argument is provided that conclusively establishes the 
inherent inadequacy of formal approaches in exploitation theory. From this 
perspective, the choice of the appropriate analytical framework is more important 
than abstract discussions on mathematics.  
A more focused set of criticisms argue that Roemer’s conclusions are wrong, 
or irrelevant, because neoclassical economics fundamentally distorts critical 
social theory and therefore cannot capture exploitation.11 A proper analysis of this 
objection, which raises deep issues relating to the role of rational choice theory in 
the social sciences, goes beyond the boundaries of this paper.12 One point should 
be made, however, concerning the use of neoclassical models in critical social 
theory that is important for the main thread of the argument. To be sure, the 
objection can be forcefully raised against specific models as ‘not all questions of 
interest in Marxism can be attacked with [general equilibrium models and game 
theory]’ (Roemer, 1982b: 285). For example, Roemer’s (1982a) discussion of 
Marx’s theory of history is not entirely compelling, as static general equilibrium 
models do not seem ‘very suitable for founding the theory of history’ (Carling, 
1997: 771). Yet the general validity of the objection is less clear as it relies on a 
narrow, if unrealistic, view of neoclassical economics as ‘ill-suited to modeling 
anything but supply, demand, and technical relationships’ (Anderson and 
Thompson, 1988: 225). For instance, the Marxian analysis of relations of power 
and contractual incompleteness in the labour market – whose absence is often 
seen as a serious limit of Roemer’s theory – can be modelled within a broadly 
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defined neoclassical framework, as in Bowles and Gintis (1990).13 Further, as 
argued by many of Roemer’s critics (e.g., Lebowitz, 1988: 195ff; Schwartz, 
1995a: 282), game theory provides a set of tools that can be fruitfully applied to 
critical social theory. The wholesale rejection of Roemer’s theory (and of all 
attempts at cross-fertilisation) is thus unwarranted, and it seems more fruitful to 
discuss whether his specific models are appropriate to analyse exploitation. 
A third set of criticisms do question the Marxist pedigree of specific 
assumptions and definitions in Roemer’s models. Some critics argue that the 
Marxian concepts of exploitation and classes cannot be analysed in models in 
which labour is not traded, or which assume perfect information, perfectly 
enforceable contracts, and freely available technology.14 Others contend that in 
Marx exploitation is central to understand social reproduction and the production 
of surplus, and ‘the important historical aspect of class societies is that exploiting 
classes, through their control over social surplus production, shape the 
reproduction of the society’ (Foley, 1989: 191). Hence Roemer’s emphasis on 
justice and normative issues is fundamentally misplaced.15  
These critiques raise important questions, but do not seem decisive. Even 
though critics muster considerable textual evidence against Roemer’s reading of 
Marx, few issues in Marxism can be settled uniquely at the exegetical level, as 
shown by various endless debates. Many of Roemer’s assumptions and results are 
consistent with Marx’s theory. For instance, that exploitation can occur without 
wage-labour is in line with Marx’s analysis of merchant capitalism: if anything, 
Roemer’s ‘implicit suggestion that Marx thought that exploitation could take 
place only through the capitalist wage relation is unfounded’ (Foley, 1989: 192). 
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Further, as acknowledged by various critics, the equilibrium of Roemer’s 
economies arguably ‘presents a recognizable version of Marx’s theory of 
capitalism’ (ibid.: 189).16 More importantly, fidelity to Marx’s writings is not a 
major constraint for Roemer (see, e.g., the introduction of Roemer, 1986), and 
thus a purely exegetical critique arguably misses the point.  
A priori criticisms of the ahistorical and abstract nature of the models are not 
conclusive either. Roemer aims to conduct a logical inquiry into the determinants 
of exploitation and the models are ‘institutional experiments’ to answer two 
questions; ‘Which institutions and characteristics of an economy are essential for 
a conception of exploitation to make sense, and which are incidental? Can we 
conceive of a theory of exploitation sufficiently general to permit definition even 
under conditions of considerable institutional variation?’ (Roemer, 1982b: 255). 
Roemer clearly distinguishes the historical and the logical relevance of the results. 
The core logical argument is the following: ‘in the real world we observe X 
(DOPA), Y (coercion in the labour process), and Z (class and exploitation). We 
have, if you will, an “empirical proposition” that X + Y ⇒ Z. Now I construct a 
model in which the following theorem holds: X + not Y ⇒ Z; from this I say that X 
is the “fundamental” cause of Z in the real world, not Y’ (Roemer, 1992: 152). 
Hence a forceful critique of Roemer’s theory cannot be limited to noting that his 
models and definitions are ahistorical (Howard and King, 1989; Dymski and 
Elliott, 1989b); that ‘his models abstract misleadingly from the real world features 
of historical capitalism that connect exploitation to its objectionable effects’ 
(Schwartz, 1995a: 275); that money, hard uncertainty, and institutions, including 
firms, are absent (Hodgson, 1989); or that unemployment and domination in the 
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workplace are neglected and the description of the production process is simplistic 
(Dymski and Elliott, 1989b; Devine and Dymski, 1991; Goldstein, 2006). 
Let Y denote, in general, the empirical features of capitalist economies 
abstracted away by Roemer. These objections establish that ‘Roemer’s inference 
is irrelevant for capitalism, because “not Y” is false for capitalism’ (Roemer, 
1992: 150). This is an important point, but it does not challenge the core logical 
argument. For instance, that ‘observed exploitation exceeds [UE exploitation] 
when forced labour or incomplete markets lead to additional exploitation’ 
(Dymski and Elliott, 1989b: 344, italics added) is entirely consistent with 
Roemer’s logical claim. Similarly, to underline ‘the essentially different dynamics 
of exploitation in [empirical labour and credit markets]’ (Hunt, 1986: 125) is not 
sufficient to challenge the isomorphism result described in section 1 above.  
The formal approach developed in the next section aims to provide an 
immanent criticism of Roemer’s theory that challenges his core substantive 
argument, and a focused critique of his models that raises doubts on the possibility 
of analysing exploitation within a standard general equilibrium framework. 
3. AN INTERTEMPORAL MODEL OF EXPLOITATION AND CLASS 
Roemer’s models can be interpreted either as a succession of one-period 
economies, or as an infinitely-lived generation; but in either case agents face no 
intertemporal trade-offs, as both intertemporal credit markets and savings are 
ruled out. To be sure, ‘constructing a model of capitalism that would reveal its 
essentially dynamic features is a different task from what mine was’ (Roemer, 
1992: 150). Yet, these assumptions seem unduly restrictive if ‘[t]he economic 
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problem for Marx, in examining capitalism, was to explain the persistent 
accumulation of wealth by one class and the persistent impoverishment of 
another’ (Roemer, 1982a: 6). In particular, whereas the absence of intertemporal 
credit markets may be justified in subsistence economies, the impossibility of 
savings seems unsatisfactory. In this section, an intertemporal generalisation of 
the subsistence economy is set up to analyse Roemer’s theory. Methodologically, 
an intertemporal model is useful to evaluate the possibility of providing 
neoclassical microfoundations to persistent exploitation and class. Substantively, 
it allows one to assess the causal and moral relevance of DOPA, focusing on its 
role in generating exploitation and classes as persistent features of a competitive 
economy in which the distribution of productive assets can change over time.  
There are two reasons to focus on subsistence economies. First, it is not 
difficult to extend Roemer’s accumulating economies and construct labour-
constrained equilibria with profits and exploitation falling to zero. Roemer’s 
results depend on differential ownership of scarce productive assets and it is not 
surprising that exploitation disappears if capital becomes abundant.17 Second, 
Roemer’s main conclusions do not depend on accumulation and one of his core 
results is precisely that ‘exploitation emerge[s] logically prior to accumulation’ 
(Roemer, 1982b: 264). The analysis of subsistence economies is therefore crucial 
in order to evaluate the core claim that DOPA and competitive markets are 
sufficient to generate exploitation.  
The model closely follows Roemer (1982a, 1988). There is a sequence of 
nonoverlapping generations, each with N identical agents. Life duration is T and 
generations are indexed by the date of birth kT, k = 0, 1, 2,… In every period t, 
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each agent ν can produce a single good with a standard linear technology (A, L), 
where xtν is the output that ν produces working on her own and ytν is the output 
that ν produces hiring others.18 Further, ν can sell her labour and ztν is ν’s labour 
supply at t, whereas Λtν = Lxtν + ztν is her total labour expended. The price of the 
good at t is pt and the wage rate is wt. Let ωtν be ν’s capital at t and let 
νω t&  be the 
derivative of ωtν with respect to time, that is, ν’s net savings. As in Roemer 
(1982a, 1988), credit markets do not exist, but the model is generalised by 
assuming that agents can save and thus face intertemporal trade-offs. In every t, 
agent ν uses her income to buy her subsistence bundle b and to purchase capital. 
Let zν = {ztν}t∈[kT, (k+1)T] denote ν’s labour supply plan; and likewise for xν, yν, 
and ων. Let (p, w) = {pt, wt}t∈[kT, (k+1)T] be the price vector during the lifetime of 
generation k.19 Let ρ ≥ 0 be the rate of time preference. Each ν chooses ξν = (xν, 
yν, zν, ων) to minimise labour subject to the constraint that in every t: (1) income is 
sufficient to reach subsistence and for saving plans; and (2) wealth is sufficient for 
production plans. Further, (3) every ν is required not to deplete her capital at the 
end of her life. Labour performed in every t should not exceed the endowment, 
which is normalised to one. Formally, ν solves the minimisation programme MPν. 
(MPν) dtΛe
Tk
kT t
t
∫
+
−
)1(
min νρ
ξν , 
subject to:  pt(1 - A)xtν + [pt (1 - A) - wtL]ytν + wtztν ≥ ptb + pt νωt& ,                  (1) 
ptA(xtν + ytν) ≤ Wtν = ptωtν,                                                                                     (2) 
νω Tk )1( +  ≥ 
νω kT ,                                                                                                        (3) 
xt
ν
, ytν, ztν, ωtν ≥ 0 and Λtν ≤ 1, all t, and for a given ω0ν. 
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In order to avoid an excess of uninteresting technicalities, it is assumed, as in 
Roemer (1982a), that agents who are able to reproduce themselves without 
working use just the amount of wealth strictly necessary to reach subsistence. By 
stating that wealthy agents do not “waste” their capital, Assumption 1 endows 
them ‘with embryonic capitalist behavior’ (ibid.: 65). Let dtΛΛ Tk
kTt t∫
−+
=
=
1)1( νν
. 
ASSUMPTION 1: For a given (p, w), if there is an optimal ξν such that Λν = 0, 
then agent ν chooses yν to minimise capital outlay dtAyp
Tk
kTt tt∫
−+
=
1)1( ν
.  
As a shorthand notation, let E(ΩkT) denote the economy with technology (A, 
L), subsistence bundle b, and distribution of endowments ΩkT ≡ ( 1kTω , 2kTω , …, 
N
kTω ). Let ∑
=
=
N
tt xx 1ν
ν ; and likewise for the other variables. For the sake of 
simplicity, let ‘all t’ stand for ‘all t, t ∈ [kT, (k + 1)T]’. Following Roemer 
(1982a), the equilibrium concept for E(ΩkT) can be defined. 
DEFINITION 2. A reproducible solution (RS) for E(ΩkT) is a vector (p, w) and an 
associated set of actions such that  
(i) ξν solves MPν, all ν; 
(ii) (xt + yt) ≥ A(xt + yt) + Nb + tω& , all t; 
(iii) A(xt + yt) ≤ ωt, all t; 
(iv) Lyt = zt, all t; 
(v) ω(k+1)T ≥ ωkT. 
Thus, at a RS, (i) every agent must optimise; in every t, there must be 
enough resources (ii) for consumption and savings, and (iii) for production plans; 
(iv) the labour market must clear in every t; (v) every generation must leave to the 
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following at least as many resources as they inherited. Given the analytical focus 
on the dynamics of exploitation with persistent capital scarcity, RS’s with a 
stationary path of capital are of focal interest. Formally, let an interior RS (IRS) 
for E(ΩkT) be a RS such that νωt&  = 0, for all ν, t, at an interior solution to MPν.  
Let λ = L(1 – A)-1 be embodied labour and let dtbΛ∆ Tk
kT t∫
+
−=
)1( )( λνν . There 
are two possible extensions of the UE definition, focusing on the amount of labour 
performed either in each period, or during the whole life of a generation.  
DEFINITION 3. At a RS for E(ΩkT), agent ν is exploited within period t, or WPt 
exploited if Λtν > λb; WPt exploiting if Λtν < λb; and WPt exploitation-neutral if 
Λtν = λb. Similarly, ν is exploited during her whole life, or WL exploited if ∆ν > 0; 
WL exploiting if ∆ν < 0; and WL exploitation-neutral if ∆ν = 0. 
By Definition 3, an agent is exploited within period t if the amount of labour 
she performs in t is higher than the amount of labour embodied in her 
consumption bundle, and similarly for the WL criterion. Both definitions convey 
normatively relevant information. The WL definition reflects the intuition that, 
from an agent’s viewpoint, being exploited in every period is certainly worse than 
being exploited only in some periods. However, it leads to the counterintuitive 
conclusion that there would be no objection to an economy in which exploitation 
– no matter how significant and widespread – existed in every period, but the 
agents’ status changed over time so as to equalise the amount of exploitation 
suffered by everyone. Instead, the WP definition seems more relevant, as it 
captures the idea that the existence of exploitation is morally relevant per se, and 
an economy with social mobility is not necessarily just, as long as some agent is 
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exploited. Hence, this paper analyses both definitions, but a special attention is 
devoted to the WP criterion which seems also more natural in an intertemporal 
setting, since it gives the opportunity to analyse the dynamics of exploitation. 
At the solution to MPν, 
νω Tk )1( +  = 
νω kT , all ν, and thus generation k = 0 can be 
considered without loss of generality. Further, at an IRS it must be pt > 0 and wt > 
0, all t, so that prices can be normalised by setting wt = 1, all t, and the profit rate 
can be written as pit = [pt(1 - A) - L]/ptA at all t. Then, Theorem 1 characterises the 
WL and WP exploitation status of each agent ν.20 
THEOREM 1. Let Wt* ≡ (pt - λ)b/pit. At an IRS for E(Ω0) such that pit > 0, all t: Λtν 
> λb, all t, and ∆ν > 0 if and only if W0ν < W0*; Λtν = λb, all t, and ∆ν = 0 if and 
only if W0ν = W0*; and Λtν < λb, all t, and ∆ν < 0 if and only if W0ν > W0*. 
Theorem 1 proves that at an IRS, the WL and WP definitions are equivalent 
and the exploitation status of each ν is a function of her initial wealth. Next, 
classes can be defined based on ‘the way in which an agent relates to the means of 
production’ (Roemer, 1982a: 70). Let (a1, a2, a3) be a vector where ai ∈ {+, 0}, i = 
1, 2, 3, and ‘+’ means a non-zero value; let Xν ≡ dtx
T
t t∫
−
=
1
0
ν
, and likewise for Yν, and 
Zν. Let Γν ≡ {(Xν, Yν, Zν): ξν solves MPν} and Γtν ≡ {(xtν, ytν, ztν): ξν solves MPν}. 
There are two dynamic extensions of Roemer’s definition of classes. 
DEFINITION 4. At a RS for E(Ω0), agent ν is a member of WP class (a1, a2, a3) in t, 
if there is an individually optimal ξν such that (xtν, ytν, ztν) has the form (a1, a2, a3) 
in t. Similarly, ν is a member of WL class (a1, a2, a3), if there is an individually 
optimal ξν such that (Xν, Yν, Zν) has the form (a1, a2, a3).  
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Following Roemer (1982a), there are five theoretically relevant WL classes. 
C1 = {ν ∈ N | Γν contains a solution (0, +, 0)}, 
C2 = {ν ∈ N| Γν contains a solution (+, +, 0), but not one of form (+, 0, 0)}, 
C3 = {ν ∈ N| Γν contains a solution (+, 0, 0)}, 
C4 = {ν ∈ N| Γν contains a solution (+, 0, +), but not one of form (+, 0, 0)}, 
C5 = {ν ∈ N| Γν contains a solution (0, 0, +)}. 
WP classes Ct1-Ct5 are similarly specified, replacing Γν with Γtν. Agents in 
C1 (Ct1) are big capitalists, who optimise without working; agents in C2 (Ct2) are 
small capitalists, who do not sell their labour; agents in C3 (Ct3) are petty 
bourgeois, who optimise without using the labour market; agents in C4 (Ct4) are 
small proletarians, who do not hire others; agents in C5 (Ct5) are proletarians.  
Theorem 2 generalises Roemer’s theory of classes: at an IRS, WP classes Ct1 
to Ct5 are pairwise disjoint and exhaustive, WP and WL class structures coincide, 
and there is a WP and WL correspondence between class and exploitation status. 
THEOREM 2. At an IRS for E(Ω0) such that pi0 ≥ ρ and pit > 0, all t: (i) For all 1≤ 
i < j≤ 5, Cti ∩ Ctj = ∅ and ∪i Cti = N, all t. (ii) Let W0ν ≠ (p0b)/pi0, all ν. For all j, 
if ν ∈ C0j then ν ∈ Ctj, all t, and ν ∈ Cj. (iii) (Class-Exploitation Correspondence 
Principle). If ν ∈ C01 ∪ C02 then ∆ν < 0 and Λtν < λb, all t; if ν ∈ C03 then ∆ν = 0 
and Λtν = λb, all t; if ν ∈ C04 ∪ C05 then ∆ν > 0 and Λtν > λb, all t. 
By Theorem 2, WP classes provide a time-invariant partition of the set of 
agents based on their position in the labour market. This partition coincides with 
that identified in Theorem 1: according to both the WP and the WL criterion, 
agents in the lower classes are exploited and agents in the upper classes are 
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exploiters. Theorems 1 and 2 thus provide a complete dynamic generalisation of 
Roemer: in equilibrium, class and exploitation status emerge endogenously and 
they are both determined by initial wealth. In Appendix 2, it is proved that if ρ > 
0, then pit = ρ, all t, is an IRS with persistent exploitation, and the intertemporal 
economy is just a replica of Roemer’s static model. However, Theorem 3 shows 
that, in the absence of time preference, exploitation is not persistent.  
THEOREM 3. Let ρ = 0. At an IRS for E(Ω0) such that pit > 0, all t: (i) for all ν ∉ 
C1, if W0ν < W0* then νtΛ&  < 0, all t; if W0ν = W0* then νtΛ&  = 0, all t; if W0ν > W0* 
then νtΛ&  > 0, all t; (ii) if T → ∞, limt→∞ Λtν = λb, and limt→∞ Wtν = λω0ν, all ν. 
Theorem 3 states that if agents can save to choose the optimal intertemporal 
allocation of labour, and time preference is ruled out, then the rich work more and 
the poor work less over time, so that WP exploitation decreases and it disappears 
in the limit, even if wealth inequalities and capital scarcity persist. In other words, 
if D denotes the dynamic features of the economy, Roemer’s core logical 
argument can be stated as ‘X + not Y + not D ⇒ Z as a persistent phenomenon’. 
Noting that the role of time preference is highly controversial in political 
philosophy, and that its relevance in exploitation theory is rather dubious, 
Theorem 3 proves instead that ‘X + not Y + D ⇒ Z is not persistent’. 
From a methodological viewpoint, these results raise doubts on the claim 
that exploitation and classes can be analysed with standard general equilibrium 
models. Roemer’s static economies do not provide convincing support to this 
claim, because the main propositions depend on two substantial departures from a 
Walrasian model, namely the absence of intertemporal credit markets and the 
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impossibility of savings. By Theorem 3, it is sufficient to allow for savings to 
make exploitation transitory, even though the economy is still far from the 
Walrasian benchmark. Skillman (1995) suggests that exogenous growth in the 
labour force, or in labour productivity, and heterogeneous saving preferences 
might make exploitation persistent, even in a Walrasian model. As noted by 
Roemer (1988: 60ff) himself, though, the normative relevance of a theory of 
exploitation critically relying on such exogenous factors would be rather unclear. 
From a substantive viewpoint, the above results provide a robust criticism of 
Roemer’s core claim that DOPA is the fundamental cause of exploitation. 
Theorem 3 proves that this claim crucially depends on some very restrictive 
assumptions, such as the impossibility of savings. If savings are allowed, DOPA 
is necessary but not sufficient to generate persistent exploitation, and an emphasis 
on asset inequalities while exploitation disappears seems misplaced. Therefore, 
although no general impossibility result is proved, the intertemporal model raises 
serious doubts on the claim that exploitation theory can be reduced to a form of 
resource egalitarianism focusing on DOPA. Indeed, the above results suggest that 
DOPA is ‘a normatively secondary (though causally primary) wrong’ (Cohen, 
1995: 199) and that Roemer’s arguments in favour of a merely distributive 
definition of exploitation need further scrutiny. 
4. EXPLOITATION, INEQUALITY, AND POWER 
Many critics object to a merely distributive definition of exploitation. Levi 
and North (1982) claim that the coercive role of the state in allocating property 
rights, and inequalities in political power are central in defining exploitation. This 
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view seems rather reductive because it is confined to the political realm, and it 
implies that democracy is sufficient to eliminate exploitation. Other authors insist, 
contra Roemer, that coercive relations in the labour market and domination in the 
workplace are necessary ingredients for exploitation, and the normatively relevant 
issue is that DOPA generates coercion, which in turns yields domination and 
alienation that harm workers’ freedom.21 These proposals are not entirely 
convincing either. An excessive weight is put on coercion, thus suggesting that 
noncoercive relations are automatically nonexploitive. Instead, as forcefully 
argued by Roemer, it is desirable to have a theory that can identify exploitation in 
mutually advantageous trades; ‘Capitalism’s necessary coercions are economic: 
… it can substantially rid itself … of extra-economic coercions, such as 
domination in the workplace … Such a capitalism might be kinder and gentler, as 
they say, but it would not be socialism’ (Roemer, 1989a: 386). Further, in 
coercion-based approaches the specific relevance of exploitation, as distinct from 
domination and alienation, is unclear, but these notions arguably capture different 
phenomena and should be kept conceptually distinct (see, Roemer, 1982b: 267ff).  
The exclusion of domination in the workplace and of coercion in the labour 
market may thus be defended on theoretical grounds. It is unclear, though, that 
weaker forms of asymmetric relations between agents should also be ruled out. 
The view that ‘the principal coercion of any mode of production is in maintaining 
its property rights, [and] our understanding of power, domination, and coercion 
can be reduced to a study of the transformation of property’ (Roemer, 1982c: 382) 
seems reductive. Following Elster (1985: 214ff), one may distinguish force, which 
involves constraints that leave little or no room for choice, from coercion, which 
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requires in addition the existence of an intentional agent. Reiman proposes that ‘A 
society is exploitative when its social structure is organized so that unpaid labor is 
systematically forced out of one class and put at the disposal of another’ (Reiman, 
1987: 3). Force is structural both in its origin, in that it is property relations that 
force labour transfers, not individuals or classes; and in its effects, in that ‘force 
affects individuals by imposing an array of fates on some group while leaving it 
open how particular individuals in that group get sorted, or sort themselves, into 
those fates’ (ibid.: 12). Structural force is compatible with some choice and it ‘is a 
kind of leverage over people to which they are vulnerable by virtue of their 
location in the social structure’ (ibid.: 14); although it is exerted by human beings, 
it need not be exercised intentionally.22 Warren outlines an even weaker, power-
inclusive account of exploitation, which ‘focuses on the broad notion of unequal 
power and not specifically on coercion’ (Warren, 1997: 62). Wood (1995, 2004) 
and Wolff (1999) also propose weaker approaches in which some form of 
vulnerability of one of the parties involved is an essential ingredient of exploitive 
relations – even though they do not provide a precise definition of this concept.  
In his models and examples, Roemer rules out all relations of force, power, 
or vulnerability – for instance, by assuming a subsistence sector that allows 
individual workers, and sometimes even the whole working class, to exit the 
proletariat. In Roemer’s theory, agents are compelled to belong to a class ‘in a 
very weak and unusual sense: being compelled does not consist in having no other 
option or in having no tolerable option, but simply in having no better option’ 
(van Parijs, 1986: 477, fn.14). And his approach can only account for forms of 
unfreedom that seem inadequate in the context of exploitive relations, whereby 
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‘DOPA denies [the exploited] the sort of “positive” freedom involved in having 
the resources to do as they might, to exercise their options’ (Schwartz, 1995a: 
300); and for arguably narrow notions of power, such as the power necessary to 
maintain property relations, as already noted.  
According to Roemer (1989b,c), a notion of force is unnecessary to define 
exploitation: provided DOPA is unjust, wealthy agents exploit poor ones, even if 
the latter can reach subsistence working on their own, and thus are not forced. The 
latter argument is intuitively appealing, insofar as it stresses the relevance of 
distributive issues. Yet, Roemer’s purely distributive approach ignores some 
arguably salient features of exploitive relations.23 In Roemer’s theory, exploitation 
is not defined relationally: ‘The statement “A is exploited by B” is not defined, 
bur rather “A is an exploiter” and “B is exploited”’ (Roemer, 1985: 31). It only 
measures a person’s position in the economy with respect to labour flows or, in 
general, to the relevant index of well-being. Nor does Roemer’s theory capture the 
causal dimension of exploitation, which has to do with the idea of taking 
advantage of someone, that is, ‘when I derive a benefit from another person being 
placed in such a situation that his best option is to act in a way that is to my 
benefit’ (Elster, 1982: 364).24  
The causal and relational dimension of UE, for example, reduces to the fact 
that, even without a labour market, in equilibrium exploiters work less than the 
average because the exploited work more: somehow, the latter are working “for” 
the former (see Roemer, 1982b: 258-9). The causal dimension of exploitation is 
also difficult to capture within PR, because, as forcefully argued by Elster, 
counterfactual statements, such as (i)-(ii), cannot capture causality: ‘The truth of 
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“If A had not been present, B would not have been present” is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for the truth of “A caused B”’ (Elster, 1982: 367).  
But then, the informational basis of purely distributive approaches, such as 
UE or PR, seems too impoverished to capture exploitive relations and to 
distinguish exploitation from other forms of injustice or wrongs. If UE is adopted, 
for example, it is in principle impossible to discriminate between exploitive 
relations and voluntary labour transfers. More importantly, according to PR – 
Roemer’s general definition – a diagnosis of exploitation can emerge even if there 
is no interaction between coalitions, as in the case of two autarchic islands with 
DOPA; or when the relation of dependence between coalitions is of the wrong 
kind for it to be a relation of exploitation. In fact, according to (i)-(ii), ‘someone 
choosing to live austerely on the meager interest yielded by a smaller than average 
capital endowment is … capitalistically exploited’ (van Parijs, 1986: 476, fn.11). 
Further, rich puritans exploit spendthrift neighbours if their greater wealth is 
inspired by the cautionary example of the latter (Elster, 1982), and compulsory 
support for the children or the needy is exploitive (Kymlicka, 2002: 183). These 
examples do not carry any resemblance to capitalist/worker relations, but they 
appear as different instances of the same phenomenon. This is because the merely 
distributive conditions (i)-(ii) embody a principle of social neutrality, whereby 
‘The criterion of exploitativeness is neutral with respect to social features of 
states, appealing only to their material features’ (Sensat, 1984: 24). Based on the 
same ‘material’ data, namely DOPA and the resulting welfare inequalities, 
according to (i)-(ii), the above examples are akin to capitalist/worker relations, 
which seems a rather unconvincing conclusion. 
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Roemer acknowledges that (i)-(ii) are insufficient to define exploitation and 
argues that ‘the missing clause … concerns the dominance of the exploiter over 
the exploited’ (Roemer, 1982d: 304, fn.12). The counterexamples are ruled out, 
according to him, if the following condition is added in Definition 1: (iii) S' is in a 
relation of dominance to S. Given Roemer’s emphasis on the distributive aspects 
of exploitation, the addition of (iii) is rather puzzling. To be sure, Roemer does 
not provide a precise definition of (iii) and oscillates between including it 
(Roemer, 1982a,e) or not (Roemer, 1982b, 1985, 1988), thus suggesting that (iii) 
has not the same logical status as (i)-(ii) and that its function is only to rule out 
‘examples that are “noneconomic” in some sense’ (Roemer 1982d: 313, fn.24), or 
even ‘pathological’ (Roemer, 1982a: 195).25 Welfare benefits or child support, 
though, do not seem ‘pathological’ or ‘noneconomic’ in any relevant sense. 
Moreover, a generic appeal to an undefined notion of dominance is unsatisfactory, 
and there are conceivable definitions of (iii) such that the above counterexamples 
remain valid; for example, in the case of compulsory welfare payments.26 A 
precise notion of dominance seems thus a necessary part of Definition 1. Yet, 
dominance is not consistent with Roemer’s theory and many of his conclusions. 
To begin with, several of Roemer’s examples should be reconsidered in the 
light of (iii). Take for instance Karl who consumes little, does not work, and lends 
his little capital to rich Adam who works and consumes more, and pays interest to 
Karl (Roemer, 1985: 58ff). According to UE, Karl exploits Adam even if Adam is 
wealthier, but, suggests Roemer, this conflicts with our moral intuitions. Instead 
PR gives the right verdict: ‘Adam is unjustly gaining from the flows between him 
and Karl, if the initial distribution of stocks is unjust against Karl’ (Roemer, 1985: 
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60). At a closer inspection, it is unclear that this example sheds any light on 
exploitation. If dominance is essential to define exploitation, it should be 
explicitly included. In the absence of dominance, the example may be capturing 
some form of injustice, but not an exploitive relation between Adam and Karl. As 
argued by Reiman (1987: 25ff), this kind of example may show at most that PR is 
a better distributive definition than UE, but then the problem may be the 
distributive approach itself. UE may render the wrong judgment because it does 
not include dominance, or power, not because it is uncorrelated with DOPA.27 
More importantly, Roemer’s attempts to include dominance are ‘ad hoc 
since they are disconnected from the “ethical imperative” he identifies as the basis 
of exploitation theory’ (Kymlicka, 2002: 204 fn.13). As acknowledged by Roemer 
(1982b: 277, fn.15), because dominance is undefined ‘the addition of [(iii)] is ad 
hoc … (With respect to our earlier discussion domination exists at the point of 
maintaining property relations.)’ As a definitional requirement, (iii) sits uneasily 
with the claim that exploitation should, or can, be reduced to a kind of distributive 
injustice and Roemer’s attempts to capture the interaction between coalitions in 
(iii) seem inevitably inconsistent with the main thrust of his approach. 
In later contributions, Roemer has acknowledged the limits of PR and has 
proposed that ‘an agent is exploited in the Marxist sense, or capitalistically 
exploited, if and only if PR holds and the exploiter gains by virtue of the labor of 
the exploited’ (Roemer, 1989c: 96). According to him, in fact ‘the expenditure of 
effort is characteristically associated with exploitation’ (ibid.: fn.11). This is 
almost a U-turn. First, Roemer (1989b: 258) admits to be ‘now less convinced of 
PR’s superiority to UE’ and under the revised definition an allocation is deemed 
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exploitive if both PR and UE diagnose it (Roemer, 1989b: 260; 1989c: 96). 
Second, the information set necessary to evaluate exploitation is significantly 
enlarged and the emphasis on effort may be read as an implicit acknowledgment 
of the importance of the causal dimension of exploitation. Yet, the revised 
definition remains purely distributive, consistently with the ethical imperative of 
Roemer’s theory, and thus in the light of the above discussion, it should not be 
surprising that it is vulnerable to counterexamples (see, e.g., Reiman, 1990: 106-
7). Therefore it seems necessary to go beyond Roemer to incorporate a notion of 
power, or dominance, in exploitation theory.  
5. CONCLUSION 
Roemer’s theory is an important and insightful contribution, and it sets an 
unsurpassed standard of rigour in exploitation theory. Rather than the last word on 
exploitation, though, this paper suggests that it should be considered as a starting 
point for further research. If, as forcefully argued by Roemer, distributive issues 
are crucial, it may be unsatisfactory to regard exploitation as being more ‘a 
description of the process to which producers are subject – forced surplus transfer 
– than of its outcome’ (Schwartz, 1995b: 160).28 However, this paper argues that 
exploitation is not reducible to a kind of resource egalitarianism. Asset 
inequalities are necessary but not sufficient to yield persistent exploitation, and 
DOPA seems a causally primary but normatively secondary wrong. Actually, the 
view that exploitation should be defined in purely distributive terms is questioned, 
and it is argued that distributive approaches are at best incomplete, and a notion of 
power, or dominance, is necessary to define exploitation.  
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Although this paper does not aim to provide a full-fledged alternative to 
Roemer’s theory, in the rest of this section some lines for further research are 
briefly discussed, which lead beyond a distributive conception of exploitation. A 
particularly interesting approach, proposed (in slightly different versions) by 
various scholars, defines exploitation as involving both the outcome and the 
structure of the interaction between agents. For example, according to Warren 
(1997: 63), ‘exploitation involves inequality on both ends of exchange: inequality 
defining the context of the exchange (that is, [DOPA]) and inequality defining the 
outcome (that is, unequal performance of labor)’. In this perspective, ‘it is not 
unequal power itself that is supposed objectionable, but rather the fact that one 
person gains unjustly through the exercise of power (whether coercive or 
uncoercive) over another’ (ibid.: 62). From a positive viewpoint, this approach 
allows for a more complex, and arguably more satisfactory account of the causal 
relation between DOPA – and the associated unequal power – and the unequal 
exchanges to which it gives rise. Thus, exploitation diagnoses the process through 
which ‘certain inequalities in incomes are generated by inequalities in rights and 
powers over productive resources: the inequalities occur, in part at least, through 
the ways in which the exploiters, by virtue of their exclusionary rights and powers 
over resources, are able to appropriate labour effort of the exploited’ (Wright, 
2000: 1563).  
From a normative viewpoint, unlike in Roemer’s theory, this approach 
allows for the ‘distinction between exploitation and the conditions of exploitation’ 
(Warren, 1997: 56).29 Hence asset inequalities are questionable because they 
create the exploitive conditions necessary for the transfer of labour to occur, that 
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is, for the asymmetric relations of power that control over productive assets 
brings. So, even if DOPA arises in morally unobjectionable ways, this does not 
mean that the wage relation is not exploitive. ‘Even if one did not unfairly create a 
situation in which one has greater economic power …, it might still be objected 
that it is wrong to take advantage of such a situation’ (ibid.: 66). This provides a 
rationale for the claim that the socialisation of assets is not just one of the possible 
means to reach an egalitarian allocation. It is an essential ingredient to eradicate 
exploitation by removing ‘the leverage that ownership of means of production 
gives owners over nonowners’ (Reiman, 1987: 29), independently of how DOPA 
was created. This kind of leverage is different from domination in the workplace, 
but also from coercion in the protection of property rights, as it would obtain even 
if all agents respected property rights willingly.  
These proposals have not yet attained a degree of mathematical rigour 
comparable with Roemer’s theory, and this is probably due to the difficulty of 
modelling power, or dominance, within exploitive relations. Consistently with the 
methodological discussion in section 2 above, however, it is possible to indicate 
two formal approaches, within a broadly defined neoclassical tradition, that may 
be worth exploring. The first approach, already mentioned in section 2, is the 
theory of contested exchange proposed by Bowles and Gintis (1990), given its 
emphasis on contractual incompleteness and conflicts of interests between parties. 
Another approach that seems particularly promising in the light of the analysis of 
this paper, is the property rights theory of the firm (Hart, 1995). Given its concern 
with power and the emphasis on the role of physical assets in explaining 
hierarchical relations and the existence of firms, the property rights approach may 
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provide an interesting analytical and theoretical framework to analyse exploitive 
relations which goes beyond purely distributive views and is consistent with the 
idea that asset inequalities are causally primary, but normatively secondary.  
To abandon a purely distributive perspective may lead to assign a more 
limited scope to exploitation theory, and this may be considered as a shortcoming. 
Some authors already deem Roemer’s theory insufficiently general because it is 
insensitive to non-class forms of exploitation, such as gender disadvantage 
(Jacobs, 1996); or ‘job exploitation’ – unequal material advantages between 
employed and unemployed workers (van Parijs, 1986). If exploitation theory is 
understood as a general theory of justice, as Roemer himself sometimes seems to 
suggest (e.g., Roemer, 1988: 134), these objections may be relevant. They are less 
persuasive if exploitation is seen as one, albeit a central one, of the wrongs that 
may characterise economic relations. To say ‘that all forms of injustice are forms 
of exploitation is not to gain insight but to lose a word’ (Kymlicka, 2002: 184). 
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APPENDIX 1: PROOFS OF FORMAL RESULTS 
In order to prove Theorems 1-3, some preliminary results must be 
established. First, it is immediate to show that, under Assumption 1, at the 
solution to MPν, the revenue constraint (1) binds, for all ν, t. Next, Lemma 1 
proves that at an IRS, the profit rate is nonnegative and the wealth constraint (2) 
binds at all t for all agents who work at the solution to MPν. 
LEMMA 1. Let (p, w) be an IRS for E(Ω0). Then pit ≥ 0, all t. Furthermore, if pit > 0, 
all t, then ptA(xtν + ytν) = Wtν, all t, for all ν such that Λν > 0. 
Proof. If pit < 0, some t, then individual optimisation implies xtν + ytν = 0, all ν, 
contradicting Definition 1(ii), given b > 0. Next, if pit > 0, all t, but ptA(xtν + 
ytν) < ptωtν, some t, then it is possible to increase ytν thus making the net 
revenue constraint slack at t without increasing Λtν, which contradicts 
individual optimisation. █ 
Lemma 2 proves a necessary condition for a price vector to be an IRS. 
LEMMA 2. At an IRS for E(Ω0) with pit > 0, all t, tp&  = (ρ - pit)pt, all t. 
Proof. Consider agent ν who works at the optimum. (The existence of such ν is 
guaranteed by Definition 1(ii), noting that b > 0.) Because constraints (1) and 
(2) bind, MPν can be reduced as follows.  
(MPν) dtΛe
T
t
t
∫
−
0
min νρ
ξν
, 
subject to:  νωt&  = pitωtν + (Λtν/pt) - b,                                                 (A1) 
ωT
ν
 ≥ ω0ν, ωtν ≥ 0, and Λtν ≤ 1, all t, and for a given ω0ν. 
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The Hamiltonian of MPν is H = e-ρtΛtν + µt[pitωtν + (Λtν/pt) - b - νω t& ] and the 
first order conditions are (A1) and 
e
-ρt
 = µt/pt,                                                                                                   (A2) 
tµ& = - µtpit.                                                                                                  (A3) 
Differentiating (A2) with respect to t and using (A3) gives the desired 
result.█ 
Remark: If 1 ≥ ptb - pitptω0ν ≥ 0 all t, standard results in dynamic optimisation 
guarantee that the first order conditions are also sufficient. 
Proof of Theorem 1. At an IRS, Λtν = max {0, ptb - pitptω0ν }, all t, ν, and thus at 
any t, Λtν = λb if and only if Wtν = Wt*. By the strict monotonicity of Λtν in 
Wtν, at all t, it follows that Λtν > λb if and only if Wtν < Wt* and Λtν < λb if 
and only if Wtν > Wt*. But then the result follows immediately by noting that 
at an IRS, if W0ν = W0* then Wtν = Wt*, all t, if W0ν > W0* then Wtν > Wt*, all t, 
and if W0ν < W0* then Wtν < Wt*, all t.█ 
Proof of Theorem 2. Part (i). At all t, let W’t = ptA(1 – A)-1b. As in Roemer 
(1982a, Appendix 2.1), it is possible to prove that at an IRS at all t: Ct1 = {ν 
∈ N: Wtν ≥ (ptb)/pit}, Ct2 = {ν ∈ N: (ptb)/pit > Wtν > W’t }, Ct3 = {ν ∈ N: Wtν = 
W’t }, Ct4 = {ν ∈ N: W’t > Wtν > 0}, and Ct5 = {ν ∈ N: Wtν = 0}.  
Part (ii). First, it is immediate to prove that at an IRS, ν ∈ Ctj, all t, if and 
only if ν ∈ Cj, j ∈ {1, 5}. Next, consider classes j = 2, 3, 4. At an IRS, W0ν < 
W’0 implies Wtν < W’t, all t, W0ν = W’0 implies Wtν = W’t, all t, and W0ν > W’0 
implies Wtν > W’t, all t, but then the result follows by part (i). 
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Part (iii). It follows by part (ii) and Theorem 1, noting that Wt* = W’t, all t.█ 
Remark: The assumption W0ν ≠ (p0b)/pi0, all ν , is only to rule out the nongeneric 
case of agent ν with ν ∈ C01  but ν ∈ Ct2, all t, t > 0, at an IRS with pi0 > ρ.  
Proof of Theorem 3. Part (i). At an IRS, Λtν = ptb - pitptω0ν ,  all t, and all ν ∉ C1. 
Differentiating the latter expression with respect to time, one obtains νtΛ&  = 
tp& b - tpi& ptω0ν - pit tp& ω0ν, all t, ν, which can also be written as 
ν
tΛ
&
 = tp& [b – 
(L/ptA)ω0ν - pitω0ν], all t, ν. The result follows noting that by Lemma 2 tp&  < 
0, all t, and the sign of the square brackets is equal to the sign of W0* - W0ν.  
Part (ii). Using the definition of pit into the condition in Lemma 2, noting 
that ρ = 0, it follows that tp&  = - pt (1 – A)A-1 + LA-1, and the only 
dynamically stable steady state of the latter equation is pt = λ. Then the result 
follows noting that if T → ∞, then pt → λ implies C1 = ∅. █ 
APPENDIX 2: EXISTENCE OF AN IRS 
In this appendix, the existence of an IRS is proved for economies with initial 
capital ω0 = ω* ≡ A(1 – A)-1Nb: ω* is the minimum aggregate amount of capital 
necessary for a RS to exist. This is arguably the theoretically relevant case: if the 
RS is interpreted as a steady state, as in Roemer (1982a, 1988), then given the 
subsistence assumption, it is legitimate to assume that total capital in the economy 
is exactly equal to the amount necessary for reproduction. Furthermore, the case 
ω0 = ω* represents the strongest form of capital scarcity. Let pim = (1 – A)A-1: by 
assumption, pim > 0 and it is possible to define the interval D = [0, pim).  
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LEMMA 3: Let λb < 1. Let p = (1 + pi) pA – L. There exists a pi* ∈ ℜ+ such that 0 ≤ 
pb - pipω0ν ≤ 1, all ν, for all pi ∈ [0, pi *] ⊂ D 
Proof. Let hν(pi) ≡ pb - pipω0ν: hν(pi) is a continuous function and hν(0) = λb, all ν. 
Since 0 < λb < 1 then there is a largest interval [0, pi*] such that if pi ∈ [0, pi*] 
then 0 ≤ hν(pi) ≤ 1, all ν. █ 
It is now possible to prove the existence of an IRS. 
THEOREM A.1: Let ω0 = ω* and λb < 1. Let pi* be defined as in Lemma 3. (i) Let 
pρ solve pρ = (1 + ρ)pρA – L. If pi* ≥ ρ > 0, then the vector (p, w) such that wt = 1, 
pit = ρ, and pt = pρ, all t, is an IRS for E(Ω0). (ii) If ρ = 0, then for all pi0 ∈ [0, pi*] 
and associated p0 = (1 + pi0)p0A – L, the vector (p, w) determined by wt = 1, tp&  = 
- pitpt, and pt = (1 + pit) ptA – L, all t, is an IRS for E(Ω0). 
Proof. Part (i). 1. Since pit = ρ and pt = pρ, all t, by construction 0 ≤ ptb - pitptω0ν ≤ 
1, all t, ν, and tp&  = (ρ - pit)pt = 0, all t. Then, by Lemma 2, it is immediate to 
prove that the set Oν(p, w) = {ξν ≥ 0| ωtν = ω0ν, Lxtν + ztν = ptb - pitptω0ν, and 
ptA(xtν + ytν) = ptω0ν, all t} solves MPν, for all ν. 
2. By choosing ξν ∈ Oν(p, w) for all ν, conditions (i) and (v) of Definition 2 
are satisfied. Summing over ν, one obtains A(xt + yt) = ω*, all t, and xt + yt = 
(1 - A)-1Nb, all t, so that conditions (ii) and (iii) are also satisfied. Finally, by 
summing the agents’ revenue constraints it follows that zt - Lyt = 0, all t. 
Part (ii). The proof is as in Part (i), noting that pit ∈ [0, pi*], all t. The latter 
result in turn follows noting that pi0 ≥ 0 implies pt ≥ λ and pit ≥ 0, all t, and 
for any pit ∈ [0, pi*], tpi&  ≤ 0, all t. █ 
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1
 In a section devoted to ‘Ethical Issues’, the Investigation Committee on the clinical trial of the 
drug ‘Trovan’ conducted by Pfizer in 1996 in Kano (Nigeria) argue that ‘Compensations to the 
participants were minimal or non existent, as such a clear case of exploitation of the ignorant was 
established’ (Federal Ministry of Health of Nigeria, 2001: 88). 
2
 For a review of some of the debates in exploitation theory, see Nielsen and Ware (1997). 
3
 See Roemer (1982a). The subsistence model is analysed thoroughly in section 3 below. For a 
more detailed informal exposition, see Roemer (1988) and Mayer (1994). 
4
 Actually, UE exploitation (but not classes) emerges in a precapitalist subsistence economy in 
which agents only trade physical goods, inputs and outputs (Roemer, 1982a, Chp.1). 
5
 The same conclusion holds, in a more general setting, if agents are identical but labour supply is 
inelastic with respect to wealth at equilibrium prices (see Roemer, 1985, 1986). 
6
 The notion of improvement may refer to some objective measure of well-being and does not 
necessarily entail the adoption of subjective moral criteria. For a discussion of subjectivist and 
objectivist approaches in normative theory, see Roemer and Veneziani (2004). 
7
 The PR approach can be extended to other forms of exploitation by focusing on other types of 
endowments an agent may have (see, e.g., Roemer, 1982a, Chp.7). For example, feudal 
exploitation derives from an unequal distribution of feudal privileges, whereas socialist 
exploitation is due to an unequal distribution of inalienable assets, such as skills. 
8
 A similar approach is adopted by Veneziani (2005). In this paper, however, a continuous time 
setting is adopted, which provides a neater framework of analysis. Furthermore, unlike in 
Veneziani (2005), this paper explicitly analyses the crucial role of time preference. 
9
 For a thorough analysis of ‘Rational Choice Marxism’, see Veneziani (2008). 
10
 See also Dymski and Elliott (1989b) and Ripstein (1989). An interesting discussion of the limits 
of formal models in critical social theory is in Mayer (1994) and Levine (2003). 
11
 See, e.g., Anderson and Thompson (1988), Mandel (1989), Wood (1989), Hunt (1992). 
12
 For a detailed methodological discussion, see Veneziani (2008). 
13
 Yoshihara (1998) provides an interesting synthesis of Roemer’s approach and of Bowles and 
Gintis’ (1990) theory of contested exchange. 
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14
 See Reiman (1987), Anderson and Thompson (1988), Lebowitz (1988), Dymski and Elliott 
(1989a,b), Devine and Dymski (1991), Schwartz (1995a), Diquattro (1998). 
15
 See also Anderson and Thompson (1988), Dymski and Elliott (1989a,b), and Wood (1989).  
16
 See also Howard and King (1989: 397ff), and Devine and Dymski (1991: 236). 
17
 See, for instance, Devine and Dymski (1991), even though their analysis is not entirely 
compelling because they do not model the behaviour of capitalists. See Roemer (1992). 
18
 A one-good economy is analysed only to avoid a substantial number of technicalities. However, 
both the statements and the proofs of the main results are formulated so as to suggest the direction 
for generalising the model to the n-good case. 
19
 The index k is not included in order to avoid notational confusion. 
20
 The proofs of all formal results are in the appendix. 
21
 See Wright (1982), Hunt (1986), Anderson and Thompson (1988), Dymski and Elliott 
(1989a,b), and Devine and Dymski (1991). 
22
 A similar view is proposed by Schwartz (1995b: 175ff). 
23
 It is telling that, contrary to his theoretical claims, in his verbal descriptions Roemer often 
evokes the notions of power or force (e.g., Roemer, 1982a: 81; 1982b: 278; 1989a: 383). 
24
 A similar point is made by van Parijs (1986: 476, fn.11) and Buchanan (1987: 129). 
25
 Actually, Roemer has proposed a number of slightly different versions of conditions (i) to (iii), 
but the distinctions are not relevant for the main thread of the argument. For a discussion, see, e.g., 
Mayer (1994) and Kymlicka (2002). 
26
 Wright (1982: 328) also argues that according to (i)-(ii)-(iii), prison wardens exploit prisoners.  
27
 Various authors have actually questioned the theoretical relevance of Roemer’s examples, which 
often contain insufficient information to draw any firm conclusions – as acknowledged by Roemer 
himself (Roemer, 1989b) – or theoretically doubtful assumptions, such as radically heterogeneous 
preferences. See, e.g., Mayer (1994: 116-7) and Schwartz (1995a: 295). 
28
 See also Sensat (1984), Reiman (1987), Foley (1989), Wolff (1999), and Wood (1995, 2004). 
29
 See also Reiman (1987: 26; 1989: 311-2, 318) and Schwartz (1995b: 166-8, 174).  
